INTRODUCTION
Jon Snow, from the popular HBO fantasy drama, Game of Thrones, may be the most popular bastard of the twenty-first century.
1 Perhaps sadly, the television show, comparable to the late medieval period in Europe, particularly the fifteenth century, contains notions of illegitimacy that still hold true today. Most notably, [b] astards are not allowed to inherit their father s lands or titles, and have no claims to the privileges of their father s House.
2 And while the common vernacular has moved away from the word bastard, 3 children born out of wedlock (also known as nonmarital or illegitimate children) still face an uphill battle when it comes to proving paternity for the purposes of intestate inheritance. 4 If Snow stated he was under the impression that six centuries later he would be treated as equally as his brothers and sisters, one might reply you know nothing, Jon Snow. 5 The statutes and policies concerning rights of children born out of wedlock are ever changing, usually restrictive, inconsistent from state to state, and have historically disadvantaged minority children more than any other group. 6 The statistical truth is that children of color are far more likely to be born out of wedlock than Caucasian children. 7 In 1972, the United State laws of succession vary greatly in their treatment of illegitimates, the variance resting in some cases on differences in policy judgments and in others on an apparent legislative unwillingness to initiate changes in an area where pressure for change has not been intense. Note States Supreme Court noted the unfair history of illegitimacy jurisprudence when it said [t]he status of illegitimacy has expressed through the ages society s condemnation of irresponsible liaisons beyond the bonds of marriage. . . . Obviously, no child is responsible for his birth and penalizing the illegitimate child is an ineffectual as well as an unjust way of deterring the parent. 8 In the 1970s, the United States Supreme Court decided a multitude of legitimacy cases, eventually concluding that legitimacy is a classification subject to intermediate scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. 9 In most of these cases, states proposed a rationale of discouraging so called illicit behavior of bearing children out of wedlock. 10 However, the Supreme Court, at least in early cases regarding wrongful death claims of illegitimate children, found that state [s] did not demonstrate any nexus between the classifications at issue and their ability to discourage immoral behavior.
11
Still, parenthood was and is considered a question of law, 12 not fact; therefore, as statutes were struck down, they continued to be amended and changed state by state. 13 Florida is not immune to this history. The earliest legislation providing a cause of action by which a mother could institute a child-support obligation was called the Bastardy Act, enacted January 5, 1828.
14 Proceedings under the Bastardy Act were considered quasi-criminal in nature until 1951. 15 Although the Florida legal system has come a long way from quasi-criminal bastardy proceedings, and the legislature has slowly created access for children to adjudicate paternity, recent developments in the law have created 8 Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972) . 9 Katharine K. Baker, Legitimate Families and Equal Protection, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1647, 1651 (2015) . 10 The State argued that since the legislature is dealing with sin, it can deal with it selectively and is not compelled to adopt comprehensive or even consistent measures. Glona v. Am. Guarantee & Liab. Ins., 391 U.S. 73, 75 (1968) . 11 Baker, supra note 9, at 1653. 12 Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 73, 78 (1968) . 13 For example, Florida s main paternity statute, § 742.01, has been amended fourteen (14) [Vol. 13:127 an insurmountable obstacle to access to the courts for a significant population of the state. Rose v. Sonson, 16 holding an amendment to the out of wedlock statute to be only prospective in application, and the statute of limitations it is based upon, creates an inequitable result for a substantial portion of the population of Florida. The case and the statute are, in effect, currently barring a majority of adult children born out of wedlock from establishing paternity for the purposes of intestate succession in probate proceedings if they have reached the age of twenty-two prior to the death of their putative fathers. 17 This inequitable result requires remedy from the courts and/or the legislature in order to provide equal protection to children born out of wedlock.
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The Third District s holding in Rose is too restrictive and will continue to prejudice children born out of wedlock in their ability to access the courts for the purpose of intestate succession for generations to come.
19 Therefore, Rose should be reversed by the Supreme Court of Florida. In addition, the Florida Legislature needs to correct the statute to expressly provide for retroactive application, or provide a new cause of action to the class of claimants whose claims were extinguished by the former statute of limitations. 20 Of course, this goal of equal access to the courts for children born out of wedlock must be balanced with the State s legitimate interest in the orderly descent of property, including the need for a well-defined rule, ensuring notice to claimants, protecting the rights of creditors and future owners of the estate s property, avoiding additional restrictions on rights of inheritance than what already exists, and respecting finality in final dispositions.
21
Most likely, the Florida Supreme Court s hands are tied in its interpretation of the 2009 amendment because of the rule that says an intention to make a statute retroactive must be express on the part of the legislature, which is not the case for this amendment. 22 Although the legislative history expresses an intention to overrule a case applying the old 16 Rose was the first case interpreting the effect of the 2009 amendment to section 732.108 (2) 
I. BACKGROUND
A. A Brief History of Paternity Adjudication for Intestate Succession
At common law, rules governing inheritance by children born out of wedlock were archaic, referring to the children as bastards for bastardy proceedings. 25 Children born out of wedlock had little to no rights because most states followed the common law rule of nullius filius. 26 Under nullius filius, a child born out of wedlock was considered the child of no one. 27 Therefore, the child was considered to lack heritable blood, and was unable to inherit from either natural parent. 28 Under the common law, putative It was generally recognized that in the absence of any statute conferring rights of inheritance upon them, illegitimate children [were] without capacity to inherit from or through either parent. 30 Eventually, children born out of wedlock were held to be protected by equal protection guarantees in regard to benefits under the Social Security Act and access to support from putative fathers. 31 However, inheritance remained a right that could only be granted, and subject to repeal, by statute.
32
Florida courts began recognizing children born out of wedlock with the Bastardy Act in 1828. 33 The act was a child-support law, quasi-criminal in nature. 34 This law only applied to children born in Florida, and provided no right to inherit for a child born out of wedlock. 35 The state first allowed nonmarital children to inherit from a parent as the natural kindred of the mother in 1927. 36 In 1933, under section 30 of the Probate Act, Florida started allowing an illegitimate child to inherit from the father when the father provided written acknowledgement of paternity. 37 In In re Burris Estate, four children born out of wedlock claimed a right to shares of the decedent s estate, despite failing to meet the statutory requirement of paternity being acknowledged in writing by the putative father while he was living. 39 The trial court completed a full factual inquiry and found that the claimants were the natural children of the decedent. 40 Given the circumstances of the case, the trial court held that section 731.29(1), Florida Statutes (1973) was unconstitutional, in violation of the equal protection clauses of the state and federal constitutions. 41 The trial court recognized a clear interest of the state in the orderly descent of the property of its citizens, but found that such an interest did not justify the differentiation based on illegitimacy.
42 Therefore, the trial court concluded that the four illegitimate children should share equally in the estate with the three legitimate children of the deceased.
43
On appeal, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed. 44 In its opinion, the Court questioned whether denying a child born out of wedlock the right to inherit from his father could be constitutional. 45 To answer the question, the Court adopted the test as expressed by the United States Supreme Court in Trimble . . . an analysis of whether the statutory differentiation on the basis of illegitimacy is justified by the promotion of recognized state objectives. 46 Applying this test, the court noted that the state s interest in the orderly descent of property could justify a higher degree of proof for paternity than maternity. 47 However, the Court held that section 731.29(1) did not address standard of proof, but rather limited what kind of evidence could be used to meet the heightened standard. 48 The Court found that [e]ven proof beyond a reasonable doubt would be insufficient unless the illegitimate child introduced evidence of a written acknowledgement, signed by the natural father in the presence of a competent witness. 49 1976 , and allowed an illegitimate child to take an intestate share if the paternity of the child is adjudicated, either before or after the death of the father. 52 Although this new right to adjudicate paternity after the death of the putative father was a great leap forward for children born out of wedlock, the statute still had problems. For example, until October 1986, only the mother of a child born out of wedlock could bring suit to establish paternity. 53 Putative children and fathers were unable to bring paternity actions until section 742.011, amended in 1986, allowed the previously barred parties to bring paternity actions.
54
The access to the courts that the amendment to section 742.011 created was then severely limited by the Florida Supreme Court in In re Estate of Smith. 55 There, the court applied section 95.11(3)(b), thus imposing a fouryear statute of limitations for paternity actions in probate proceedings, beginning from the date that the putative child turned eighteen. 56 In Smith, a sixty-year-old brought a paternity action in probate court to assert her right to intestate succession. 57 The Court rejected the lower court s holding that section 732.108(2)(b) creates a separate and distinct statutory cause of action [for determining paternity in probate courts] which begins to run upon the death of the putative father rather than when the child reaches the age of majority. 58 Smith was denied the right to have her paternity adjudicated, as was every other citizen of Florida who had reached the age of twenty-two, even if the putative father had not yet died. 59 Thus, the statute of limitations was, in essence, a statute of repose, allowing a claim to extinguish before it ever accrued upon the death of the putative father. Stephen s mother never tried to prove paternity during Rose s childhood under section 742.011 of the Florida Statutes. 66 In 1986, section 742.011 was amended, allowing both putative children and putative fathers to bring paternity actions. 67 However, section 95.11(3)(b) of the Florida Statutes also applied, imposing a four-year statute of limitations beginning on the date the child reaches the age of majority. Rose did not bring his claim within the little time he had left. 68 Rose s father, Stephen Sonson, died intestate on June 21, 2012. 69 Rose filed a counter-petition in probate court claiming to be a surviving son of the decedent and therefore a rightful beneficiary of the estate. 70 The trial court dismissed the counter petition, holding that: This bill overrules the holding in Estate v. Smith and provides that ch. 95, F.S., does not apply in determining heirs in a probate proceeding. Therefore, this bill allows for a determination of paternity to be made in a probate proceeding for the purpose of proving heirship, even if it is more than four years after the date the child reaches majority. This change is limited to intestate succession. Id. 64 73 So, while the 2009 amendment removing the four-year statute of limitations for paternity actions in probate proceedings will certainly help Florida put its history of bastardy proceedings and unfair treatment regarding the rights of children born out of wedlock behind it, such a change may take multiple decades to truly have an effect because of the amendment s failure to apply retroactively.
Finally, the law is currently unclear on the time limitations, if any, that a person who was twenty-one or younger in 2009 has to file a paternity action in probate court. A fair and reasonable time limitation can be established so that the rights of children born out of wedlock can be balanced with the state s interest in the orderly and timely descent of the property of its citizens. The out of wedlock statute must serve the state s interest without creating an impenetrable barrier that works to shield invidious discrimination. 
B. Other Considerations: Discriminatory Effect; Advanced Technology
Discriminatory Effect
Although this Comment will not cover all the realms of important and interesting topics that one could consider when assessing the laws that govern inheritance rights of children born out of wedlock, it would be a disservice not to mention the historical discriminatory effect that these laws have had. Just as race has shaped so many areas of American society and law, family law and inheritance in Florida and in the United States has not evolved in a vacuum and has been affected by this history too.
Minorities, specifically African-Americans, are the group of people most impacted by restrictive laws related to paternity adjudication in probate court. 75 More than seventy-two percent of children in the African-American communities are born out of wedlock. 76 Almost every other minority group is above twenty-five percent. 77 Further, Florida is one of the states with the most births out of wedlock in the United States, with 206,786 nonmarital births in Florida in 2011 forty percent of all births that year. 78 Inevitably, minorities will be discriminated against by the Rose holding.
Perhaps, not so inadvertently, society has cast a false lens upon fathers of illegitimate children in minority communities. 79 Although minority fathers of children born out of wedlock are often keenly involved in raising their children, the stereotype of the absent African-American (and minority) father continues to be prevalent throughout modern society. 80 81 This racially charged history has created a system that punishes children for the so-called sins of their fathers. Lack of empathy for the father has no doubt translated to a lack of empathy for the child born out of wedlock.
82 Society s condemnation of the untraditional family has ended up harming the most innocent members of society children. 83 One also must not overlook the great diversity that makes up nonmarital children, because assuming that only poor, minority mothers and poor, absent, minority fathers bear the majority of children out of wedlock would be a grave mistake:
More than 50% of all nonmarital children today are born to cohabiting couples, 15% of which marry within a year of the child s birth. Another 14% are born to divorced women, some of which have children from a previous marriage, and 22% are born to teenage mothers. While many nonmarital children are born to low-income women, many others are born to financially successful women. Nonmarital birth rates also vary by race and ethnicity. Twenty-nine percent of children born to white women in 2008 were nonmarital, as were 53% of children born to Latinas, and 72% of children born to African-American women. 84 Future students, scholars, members of the Florida Legislature, judges, and justices should not ignore these statistics and this history in their future endeavors when analyzing and shaping the out of wedlock laws. No matter society s current or future beliefs about parents having children out of wedlock, those beliefs should not impose punishment upon children especially the historically disadvantaged who are wholly innocent of their parents acts. As the Supreme Court said, no child is responsible for his birth 81 Although technology has made it easier than ever to prove paternity, one must still balance this fact with the interest of distributing property in a timely manner, and the unlikeliness and expense of getting DNA after burial. A forever claim is not realistic, but there are more equitable timeframes for the statute of limitations, based on availability of DNA evidence, that can be implemented in Florida.
Before technology advanced to allow humans to test parentage by scientific means, there existed the maxim mater semper certa est pater semper incertus est, which translates as mother is always certain, and father is always uncertain. 86 Today s technology has completely changed the method and accuracy of how parentage is proven, almost to the point of certainty:
The current state of paternity testing technology offers an accurate, efficient, and relatively inexpensive means of establishing paternity. DNA testing may be conducted on relatively small samples of blood or cells. Tests kits marketed to consumers are readily available online and in local pharmacies at diverse price ranges. These at-home kits typically utilize a buccal swab to collect cheek cells from inside of the mouth. However, DNA collection need not be restricted to blood samples and cheek cells. DNA also can be extracted from hair and other biological material, with or without the donor s consent or knowledge. The collected cells are then sent to a laboratory for test results. Thus, the current genetic tests are less expensive, less invasive, and yield more accurate results. 92 In fact, the plaintiff s father was John L. Ryan (the decedent in the case), a close family friend. 93 Just ten days before the death of Ryan, the mother disclosed the truth to Wingate. 94 The day after Ryan s death, Joanne filed a claim under the Probate Code to establish that she was an heir to Ryan s intestate estate, and obtained a court order permitting a DNA test on blood and hair samples taken from Ryan before embalming. The tests confirmed that Ryan was her biological father.
95
Wingate is a straightforward example of using DNA testing technology after death, because the decedent s body was available to be tested prior to embalming or burial.
96 But what about disturbing the body or remains at a time further removed from the date of death? Other countries have adopted the practice, but there is no doubt that such a policy would need to be balanced with the interest of privacy. 97 In the case of Jäggi v. Switzerland, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) had to consider whether the remains of a putative father could be disturbed nearly thirty years after his death, where the child was sixty-seven years old at the time of the ECHR s judgment. 98 One can infer that the ECHR s decision in favor of the applicant was an affirmation of the practice of DNA testing, well after the death of a putative father, depending on the factual circumstances.
99
In Jäggi, the ECHR noted:
[People] seeking to establish the identity of their ascendants have a vital interest . . . in receiving the information necessary to uncover the truth . . . At the same time . . . protection of third persons may preclude their being compelled . . . for medical testing of any kind . . . .
100
[C]onsideration should be given . . . to the applicant s right to establish his parentage and . . . to the right of third parties to the inviolability of the deceased s body, the right to respect for the dead, and the public interest in preserving legal certainty. 101 Ultimately, the ECHR awarded damages to the applicant from the state for violating the applicant s rights by refusing DNA testing over a period of nearly thirty years.
102
The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, an international treaty, and the Florida statutes regarding intestate inheritance for children born out of wedlock are two very different beasts. Nonetheless, when it comes to proving paternity with DNA, genetic testing is too advanced to not consider its implications upon the issues addressed here. Both children claiming the right to inheritance and decedent estates have rights that must be balanced, and examples from other jurisdictions (both domestic and international) can help to bridge the gap in this area of law. Scientific advancements have made it so that a strict statute of limitations may no longer make sense when justified by an interest in 
II. ANALYSIS
The 
A. Retroactivity of Statutes
One of the three holdings of Rose v. Sonson was that the 2009 amendment to section 732.108(2)(b) did not apply retroactively because the Florida Legislature did not express a clear intent it was to be so applied.
103
In Florida, for a statute to be applied retroactively, the Legislature must have expressed its intention to apply the law retroactively in language that is too clear and explicit to admit of reasonable doubt. 104 One important reason for this requirement of an express intention is the need for checks and balances, and the policy against the judiciary infringing upon the legislature by creating law. 105 There is a distinction between a substantive statute and a procedural 103 Although, in Rose, the Third District Court of Appeal treated the amendment as a substantive statute because it considers heirs to have a vested interest in the estate of the decedent, it can be argued that the amendment to section 732.108(2)(b) is actually remedial or procedural. Remedial statutes operate to further a remedy or confirm rights that already exist, and a procedural law provides the means and methods for the application and enforcement of existing duties and rights. 107 The amendment at issue does not create or take away a right, it simply confirms that right by removing an unconstitutional bar to asserting the right the statute of limitations that allows claims to be lost before they ever accrue.
108
Difficulty arises even if accepting the amendment as procedural or remedial because a statute of limitations does provide a defense for a defendant to assert, providing finality and predictability to the defendant. 109 That defense may be considered a right in and of itself. Therefore, the amendment may be an act designed to serve a remedial purpose, but cannot be applied retroactively because it is clear that doing so would attach new legal consequences to events completed before its enactment. 110 Applying the amendment retroactively poses many challenges, including this substantive versus remedial/procedural issue, as well as the legislature s failure to address the need for an express intention of retroactivity within the face of the statute. 111 cases whether the expressed retroactive application of the law collides with any overriding constitutional provision. 342 So. 2d 815, 817 18 (Fla. 1976 113 Once the defense of the statute of limitations has accrued, it is protected as a property interest just as the plaintiff s right to commence an action is a valid and protected property interest. 114 Statutes that relate only to procedure or remedy generally apply to all pending cases, but a substantive law that interferes with vested rights will not be applied retrospectively. 115 However, the question must be posed are the rights truly vested if they were based on an unconstitutional application of a statute of limitations? And, does the due process concern of the so-called vested rights of the decedent and personal representative trump the due process and equal protection concerns that arise from extinguishing the illegitimate child s access to court before his or her claim has accrued? 116 To answer this question, one may look to the wisdom of another jurisdiction with substantially similar rules.
In 1981, the Court of Appeal of Tennessee, in Thompson v. Coates, dealt with a similar statute to Florida s section 732.108(2)(b).
117 Like section 732.108(2)(b) of the Florida Statutes, Tennessee s statute allows for adjudication to be proven after the death of the putative father. 118 In Thompson, an action was instituted to establish that the plaintiff was the illegitimate child of the individual whose estate the defendant was administering. 119 The defendants argued, inter alia, that the plaintiff was barred from making a claim to inheritance because the property right had 112 finally vested upon the death of the decedent. 120 This was a due process argument for the defendants property interest, much like the court in Rose acknowledged and held in favor of. 121 The court in Tennessee differed from the Third District in Rose, correctly noting that while the defendant in Thompson had a valid property interest, it was not finally vested. 122 The Court of Appeal found this lack of a finally-vested property interest to be evidenced by the fact that upon the death of a decedent [there] is the authority given the representative of an estate to utilize the real property to discharge decedent s obligations. 123 In other words, the property interest is not finally or fully vested until the probate administration is completed. The estate s property is subject to claims of creditors, allowable expenses of the decedent, pretermitted spouse and pretermitted child claims, claims for an elective share, will contests, and other similar matters. Until all these issues are resolved, no property interest is truly, fully vested. This delay in the final vesting of the rights of inheritance in the other heirs of the decedent is consistent with the delay prompted by the filing of claims by actual creditors, those seeking to assert or contest a will, etcetera.
If one compares the reasoning of the Court of Appeal in Tennessee in
Thompson, to hold in favor of the child born out of wedlock, with the reasoning of the Third District Court of Appeal in Florida in Rose, to hold against the child born out of wedlock, the Tennessee explanation is more logical and equitable. While it is true that Sonson s estate, personal representative, and legitimate children had an interest in the property, so too did Rose in claiming the property as the alleged heir of his father. 125 To rely on the restrictive, and possibly unconstitutional, statute of limitations in cases like this would effectively bar illegitimate children from establishing paternity after the death of the father. The Third District s holding that any such retroactive application would constitute a violation of the decedent s and of the co-personal representatives due process rights because Rose s claim was already extinguished 127 is wrong because the decedent and co-representative did not have vested property rights, and still had the opportunity to defend their claims from the alleged heir in probate proceedings. If anyone s due process rights would be infringed by not allowing the 2009 amendment to be retroactive, it would be the illegitimate child because strictly prospective application would effectively bar illegitimate children from establishing paternity after the death of the father.
128
B. Reverse to Revive-Goodbye In re Estate of Smith
Even if one were to accept that retroactive application would constitute a violation of the decedent s and of the co-personal representatives due process rights because Rose s claim was already extinguished, 129 and that the legislature could not make the 2009 amendment retroactive, the Florida Supreme Court may have a judicial lane around this legislative limitation overruling precedent. The four-year statute of limitations does not expressly apply to paternity claims for intestate succession after the death of the putative father. 130 Instead, the limitation was imposed upon the claimant (and future claimants) by the Florida Supreme Court in In re Estate of Smith.
131 If the Court renounces its decision in Smith and adopts a new view, then that holding, rather than the statute, could apply retroactively.
There is at least one similar example of a limitation being ruled unconstitutional such that a holding was then applied retroactively. 132 In Black v. Nesmith, a married mother filed a complaint to determine paternity against the father, who was not the husband. 133 The father moved to dismiss because the controlling statute when the child was born only allowed for the complainant to be unmarried, and the mother was married. 134 Although the statute was later amended (prior to the mother s action) to eliminate the term unmarried, the father argued that retroactive application of the amendment to permit the suit against him would be unconstitutional because his property rights were vested under the previous statute s limitations. 135 The court disagreed, noting that although the Florida Legislature did not make an express intention of retroactivity, [t]he general rule regarding retroactivity of a decision of a court of last resort overruling a decision is that such a decision is retrospective as well as prospective in its operation unless declared by the opinion to have a prospective effect only.
136
Because the limitation imposed by the word unmarried was deemed unconstitutional in a previous case, Gammon v. Cobb, the Court in Black concluded that the Gammon holding could be applied retroactively even though the legislative amendment removing the requirement that a claimant not be married was not expressly retroactive. 137 Further, the Court noted that [s]ection 742.011 is intended solely to protect the rights of illegitimate children and to insure that all children are supported by their natural fathers . . . Given this policy, we find it unlikely that the Legislature intended to create a right in defendants to avoid their obligations by using the limitations imposed within the statute to their advantage. 138 The married mother in Black could maintain her paternity action against the father based on the retroactivity of Gammon, even though at time of the child s birth the statute limited such actions to unmarried women. In its 1994 opinion, the First District Court of Appeal held in In re Estate of Smith that the statute of limitations applicable to paternity proceedings to establish support does not apply to actions to establish paternity for purposes of intestacy. 145 The court found multiple constitutional violations in that case, holding that the application of section 95.11(3)(b) would (1) allow preemption of a claim which never accrued, in violation of the state constitution and intestate succession statutes; and (2) would treat similarly situated illegitimate children, and similarly situated legitimate and illegitimate children, disparately.
146
First, the First District was correct in holding that applying section 95.11(3)(b) would allow preemption of a claim which never accrued, in violation of the Florida Constitution and intestate succession statutes.
147 Per section 732.101(2) of the Florida Statutes, [t]he decedent s death is the event that vests the heirs right to the decedent s intestate property. 148 Simple logic shows that application of the four-year statute of limitations beginning from the age of majority allows a claim to be barred before it ever accrued. Chapter 95, which houses the statute of limitations, also states that the time within which an action shall be begun under any statute of limitations runs from the time the cause of action accrues.
149
By barring the claim before it accrued, the First District held, the plaintiff s constitutional right of access to the courts was violated. 150 The statute of limitations was truly a statute of repose, allowing for discriminatory results whenever illegitimate children were unable to discover the identities of their fathers, or bring suit, before the age of twenty-two. As the Court noted in Black that section 742.011 is intended solely to protect the rights of illegitimate children, it should apply the same understanding to section 732.108(2)(b).
151 Under the umbrella of such a policy, it is unlikely that the Legislature intended to create a right in defendants to avoid their obligations by using the limitations imposed within the statute to their advantage. which held the same statute of limitations unconstitutional as it related to claims for support. 155 There, the Court balanced the state s objective to avoid stale claims against the impact of the statute upon illegitimates deprived of their right to support. 156 The First District in Smith noted that the holding in West, striking the statute on equal protection grounds, was instructive to its analysis.
157
Although proof of paternity may become more difficult with the passage of time, this mere possibility cannot be allowed to work an unconstitutional discrimination against illegitimate children.
158 Like West, it should be unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause to allow legitimate offspring to have a claim accrue at the death of the father, while forcing a child born out of wedlock to surrender such a claim before it ever accrues. Further, in Black, the court discussed West and noted its 149 FLA. STAT. § 95.11(3)(b) (2017). 150 Smith, 640 So. 2d at 1155. 151 Black v. Nesmith, 475 So. 2d 963, 965 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985). 152 Id.
153
As applied below, the statute also treats similarly situated illegitimate children with disparity for the child whose father dies during the child s minority, the right to seek inheritance is always preserved; for the child who is twenty-two or older at her father s death, the right would never be preserved. In re Estate of Smith, 640 So. 2d 1152, 1156 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
154 State, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. West, 378 So. 2d 1220, 1222 (Fla. 1979) . 155 Smith, 640 So. 2d at 1155. 156 Id. 157 Id. 158 Id.
acquiescence to the fact that [t]his holding operated to deprive West of a defense which had clearly existed at the child s birth. 159 Florida must accept the premise that illegitimate children are not nonpersons. They are humans, live, and have their being. They are clearly persons within the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
160
West and Black illustrate that an unconstitutional application of section 95.11(3)(b) to bar a paternity complaint can be overcome despite the defense the limitation provided the father, whether being applied to section 742.011 in West, or section 732.108(2)(b) in Rose, and future paternity actions brought in probate proceedings. 161 Therefore, if the Florida Supreme Court overrules its decision In re Estate of Smith, and adopts the lower court s holding that section 95.11(3)(b) s four-year statute of limitations was unconstitutional, it cannot be said that all claims expired under that statute are truly extinguished. Of course, retroactive application of a Supreme Court holding would need some limitation to protect the state s valid interest in avoiding stale claims, finality in final dispositions, and the orderly descent of property. Such interests are not present for claimants such as Rose, where the probate case is still happening and the claimant is imposing no additional burden upon the state, court or estate of the decedent than any common creditor would be. Retroactive application of a Supreme Court decision to overrule In re Estate of Smith would be more than appropriate it would be equitable.
If the Supreme Court were to take up a case involving 732.108(b)(2) 162 , the Court would accept that section 95.11(3)(b) never applied to determining heirs in a probate proceeding for intestate inheritance. Such a holding would allow claimants like Rose, and other similarly situated children born out of wedlock, to assert their constitutional right of access to the courts by petitioning their claims for intestate inheritance as putative children of the deceased. In fact, the four-year statute of limitations can be considered unconstitutional just as former section 731.29, which required written acknowledgment of paternity by the father of the illegitimate child in order for that child to inherit from the father via intestate succession, and violated an illegitimate child s right to equal protection. 163 For example, imagine a girl born out of wedlock has a close relationship with her putative father. 165 The girl lives at least part time with the father and grows up in the same home as her half brothers and sisters. For whatever reason, the father never adopts the child, marries the mother, or acknowledges the paternity in writing. 166 She grows up, reaches majority, goes to college, and makes a life. Her father becomes the grandfather of her children, the father-in-law to her husband, etcetera. Eventually, the father dies, without a will, so that his estate is to pass through intestate succession. No doubt that because the daughter grew up with her father s other children, and she maintained an open relationship with him throughout her life, the other children and any other interested parties to the estate were on notice that the girl was the daughter of the deceased and would make a claim on his estate. In this instance, the stale claim justification of the four-year statute of limitations from the time the daughter turned eighteen would simply be a veil for discrimination against the daughter because the limitation would operate just the same, whether the other interested parties were on notice or not.
If a legitimate heir may claim inheritance in a probate proceeding, there is no reason for a putative father s estate to be shielded by an unconstitutional statute of limitations from an illegitimate heir s equally valid claim. Like In re Burris Estate, such a statute does not serve the state s interest asserted in Rose (avoiding stale claims or the due process rights of the defendants), but instead creates an impenetrable barrier that works to shield invidious discrimination. 167 By overruling In re Estate of Smith and adopting the First District Court of Appeal s opinion, the Florida Supreme Court would be applying the statute retroactively by noting the unconstitutionality of the previous statute. The result would be that the claims were not extinguished because the statute was void as applied to paternity claims in probate proceedings for the purposes of intestate succession.
C. Provide A New Claim in Lieu of Reviving the Old One
As with any evolving area of the law, the arguments above are not certain to succeed. The Florida Supreme Court is not as predictable as Jon 164 Id. at 155. 165 More than 50% of all nonmarital children today are born to cohabiting couples. 
169
While such a decision would be wrong, it is not wholly out of the purview of valid legal argument. Therefore, there is an alternative route that could circumvent any roadblocks the Supreme Court could erect amend section 732.108(2)(b) to provide a new cause of action. Provide rather than revive. If there is a political will to do so, the Florida Legislature could provide for a new cause of action that would allow claimants currently barred by the now inapplicable statute of limitations to once again assert their constitutional right of access to the courts.
The First District Court of Appeal, perhaps by accident, has provided a potential title to the new cause of action in its quashed opinion in In re Estate of Smith The Action to Inherit. 170 For the sake of clarity, the title to the amendment could be The Action for Children Born out of Wedlock to Inherit. The proposed amendment should be entered as a subsection to section 732.108(2)(b). The amended statute could read as follows, with the added language in italics:
732.108. Adopted persons and persons born out of wedlock (2) For the purpose of intestate succession in cases not covered by subsection (1) . . . The person is also a descendant of his or her father and is one of the natural kindred of all members of the father s family, if: (b) The paternity of the father is established by an adjudication before or after the death of the father. Chapter 95 shall not apply in determining heirs in a probate proceeding under this paragraph. (A) Establishing paternity for the purpose of intestate succession shall be a distinct cause of action from 168 Spoiler alert, most of Jon s family is murdered throughout Game of Thrones, and a group of disloyal men turn on him. 169 (1) what statute of limitations, or time limit, if any, should apply to this new cause of action; and (2) how should this new cause of action affect children born out of wedlock who reached the age of majority before their father died, when section 95.11(3)(b) was applicable, and the probate proceedings have since been completed.
The answer to the second question is simple: the state s interest in finality and the orderly descent of property is too strong to justify opening a closed probate administration. If this limitation were not imposed, the courts would be overrun with alleged heirs reopening probate administrations and unsettling vested property interests. Such a result cannot be supported. Rather, the intended purpose of the proposed amendment is to allow a claimant to assert his or her status as child born out of wedlock when the claimant would be imposing no additional burden upon the state, court, or estate of the decedent than any other heir would be. Quite simply, this proposed amendment would extend the application of the 2009 amendment to section 732.108(2)(b) to the additional parties that the legislature contemplated when it expressed its intention to overrule In re Estate of Smith in its Staff Analysis. limitations, which could run prior to the death of the father. 175 However, the court said in Thompson v. Coates that the statute of limitations would not apply because if the ten-year period ran before the father s death, the child would be barred from bringing suit to establish his share of the estate, even though the statute specifically allows suit to be brought after the death of the father.
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Section 732.108(2)(b) of the Florida Statutes also clearly established that the paternity of the father may be established by an adjudication before or after the death of the father. 177 Using the same reasoning as Thompson, one finds that allowing the alleged heir s claim to extinguish before the father s death is in contravention to Florida s policy of allowing children to prove paternity for the purpose of intestate succession after the father s death. Florida should consider a policy like Tennessee s for several reasons. Such a standard provides a well-defined rule, notice to claimants, guarantees an opportunity to prove paternity after death, protects the rights of creditors and future owners of the estate s property, and creates no additional restrictions on rights of inheritance than what already exists (such as creditors, taxing authorities, and legitimate children). 178 Although the creditor time limit may seem arbitrary, the Court in Tennessee was able to justify this decision:
While conceding that its decision was somewhat arbitrary, the Court explained that it chose this limitations period because (1) it could be implemented by reference to familiar and well defined rules, (2) it provided the constitutionally mandated notice to claimants, (3) it protected the rights of creditors and subsequent property owners, (4) it posed no threat to rights of inheritance beyond those already posed by creditors and taxing authorities, and (5) it retained the current degree of dependability in the titles to intestate property. 179 In Glanton v. Lord, cousins filed separate actions seeking sale and partition of real property previously owned by their deceased uncle and grandfather, and determination of inheritance rights of the decedents putative heirs. 180 The cousins argued, inter alia, that because their uncle had been dead for forty years, and the putative children had not made their claim within the ten-year catch-all statute of limitations, they were barred from claiming inheritance. 181 The Court of Appeals of Tennessee disagreed, holding that even if the statute of limitations applied to claims for inheritance by children born out of wedlock, [t]he statutes of limitation applicable to creditors claims and thus to a non-marital child s claim of paternity and a corresponding right to inherit by intestate succession does not begin to run until after a decedent s estate is submitted to probate and a statutory Notice to Creditors is published.
182 Because the decedent s estate was never submitted to probate, the limitations period had not begun to run, and the claim of the putative children was timely.
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Florida should adopt the same understanding of its statute defining the rights of children born out of wedlock to inherit through intestate succession. The rights of potential heirs should not vest until after certain conditions are met, including the satisfaction of valid claims of creditors. Providing children born out of wedlock the same access to intestate succession puts no additional time burden on other parties interested in the administration of the estate. Therefore, allowing the right to assert a claim for inheritance through paternity to expire prior to the death of the putative father, or before the probate administration has been opened, would be in contravention of the statutory purpose indicated by the Florida Legislature and Supreme Court, as was held in Tennessee. 184 
New York
New York is also very forgiving, removing time limits for bringing the inheritance claim, but including limitation on which children born out of wedlock have standing to bring the claim. 185 Although the statute defining the right of nonmarital children to inherit from their fathers is somewhat different than Florida s section 732.108(2)(b), its application by the courts is telling of how the policy of the statute is important in the interpretation of the 181 Id. 182 Id. at 400. 183 Id. at 398. 184 Thus, the imposition of such a requirement would, in many cases, essentially undermine the statutory command that non-marital children be allowed to inherit by intestate succession from or through their biological father if paternity is established by an adjudication before the father s 187 If a non-marital child discovers belatedly that her father has died, she can seek an accounting if the statute of limitations has not run. 188 The statute of limitations begins to run when the fiduciary openly repudiates his fiduciary obligations. 189 However, not every non-marital child in New York can assert their claim of paternity for purposes of intestate succession: The language of Section 4-1.2(a)(2)(C) states that a nonmarital child can inherit from a biological father s estate if paternity has been established by clear and convincing evidence and the father of the child has openly and notoriously acknowledged the child as his own. 190 Thus, in New York, a nonmarital child cannot become an heir to the estate of the putative father the child did not know. 191 Originally, New York case law said that genetic testing must be administered during a putative father s lifetime for the results to be admissible to establish paternity in an heirship proceeding. 192 However, in 2006, the court in In re Davis said that genetic testing to prove paternity after death was allowed so long as there was an open and notorious acknowledgement of paternity. not see a need for a limitation such as New York has implemented, there is no arguing against its pragmatism.
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III. CONCLUSION
Like fictional fifteenth century Jon Snow, children born out of wedlock in the twenty-first century continue to face laws that discriminate against them for decisions they played no part in. Florida s Third District Court of Appeal s holding in Rose v. Sonson creates an inequitable result for children born out of wedlock, now twenty-nine years or older, who seek to establish paternity for the purpose of intestate succession after their fathers pass away.
195 By ignoring the Legislature s intention, as expressed by its Staff Analysis, to overrule the decision of In re Estate of Smith, the court allowed an unconstitutional statute of limitations to continue to apply to a substantial portion of Florida s population.
196 Smith incorrectly applied section 95.11(3)(b) to section 732.108(2)(b) so that a child born out of wedlock only had four years from the age of majority to assert a paternity claim. 197 If the child waited until the death of the putative father, more than four years after attaining the age of majority, to bring the claim, then the child was barred from bringing his or her claim. This decision in Smith was in contravention of the express language of section 732.108(2)(b) that says the claim for paternity can be brought after death with clear and convincing evidence. between precedent and policy, the amendment was not applied retroactively. 199 If the legislature can legally act to expressly make the statute retroactive, it should. However, it may be impossible to affect a result other than what Rose implies that anyone twenty-nine years old or older in 2016 is barred from paternity claims in probate court, because of the possibility that retroactive application is not allowed due to its effect on the rights of decedents estates and representatives to protect their property interests with the statute of limitation. 200 Although there are cases interpreting other statutes (and similar statutes in other jurisdictions), showing that the statute of limitation has not created a fully vested right in other interested parties, such as heirs, and that the rights of those negatively affected by the change in the statute of limitations are not as strong as those who are losing their claim because of the limitation, 201 the Court has not adopted that view for cases under section 732.108(2)(b). For now, Florida would likely see this as a violation of due process for the party losing the statute of limitations as a defense, rather than a violation of due process and equal protection by extinguishing a nonmarital child s claim before it accrued, or treating the nonmarital child differently than similarly situated legitimate children. 202 If the Legislature cannot make the statute retroactive, the Florida Supreme Court may choose to overrule In re Estate of Smith. While the Court cannot make the amendment retroactive without an express intent to do so by the legislature, it can look to the legislative history of the amendment to see an intention to overrule Smith the seminal case applying the four-year statute of limitations on adjudications of paternity in probate proceedings for intestate succession. By heeding the legislature s intention and revisiting Smith, the Court can overrule the decision and adopt the lower court s holding that application of the limitation would be unconstitutional by infringing on the right to access to the courts and equal protection by preempting a claim which has not accrued, and treating children born out of wedlock differently from legitimate children without proper justification. With the precedent of Smith reversed, the 2009 amendment will apply retroactively, in a sense, by allowing claimants such as Rose to bring their claims. However, the state s interest would still be served because the amendment would not revive claims on estates that have already been fully administered.
If the Legislature cannot make the amendment retroactive, and the Supreme Court will not overrule precedent that applied the statute of limitations in the first place, then the Legislature could choose to supply a new claim The Action for Children Born out of Wedlock to Inherit. By providing a new claim, the Legislature would be able to act quickly instead of waiting for the Supreme Court to take up the issue (if it ever does) and avoid the potential unconstitutionality of an amendment for retroactive application. The amendment would not apply to nonmarital children whose fathers estates have already been administered and closed before the enactment of the amendment, thus protecting the state s interest in finality, avoiding stale claims, and protecting vested property interests.
The proposed amendment would have to address the issue of what time frame, if any, should apply to the new cause of action. Based on analysis of states with intestacy and out of wedlock statutes that effectively meet the goal of adding no additional time burden to the administration process while protecting the interests of children born out of wedlock, Tennessee and New York each supply guidance for what time limitations should be imposed on this new cause of action. Ultimately, the applicable time limitation should provide a well-defined rule, notice to claimants, guarantee an opportunity to prove paternity after death, protect the rights of creditors and future owners of the estate s property, and create no additional restrictions on rights of inheritance than what already exist (such as creditors, taxing authorities, and legitimate children). Tennessee s system does best to achieve these goals by forcing nonmarital children to bring a claim within the time allowed for creditors to file claims against the decedent s estate.
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However Florida chooses to proceed, policy makers and the judiciary must recognize the history of discrimination against children born out of wedlock from Jon Snow to Stephen Rose. Equal protection and due process must be afforded to nonmarital children, who should not suffer for the socalled sins of their fathers. The time has come to end disproportionate treatment toward out of wedlock children in Florida s probate system.
